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Conspiracism, Secrecy and Security in Restoration 
France: Denouncing the Jesuit Menace 
Geoffrey Cubitt ∗ 
Abstract: »Verschwörungstheorien, Geheimnis und Sicherheit im Frankreich der 
Restaurationszeit: das Propagieren der Jesuiten-Bedrohung«. This article ex-
plores the historical and conceptual relationships between themes of conspira-
cy, secrecy and securitization, firstly through a general schematic discussion of 
their interconnections, and then through a specific focus on the polemics and 
strategies of the French Bourbon Restoration period (1814-1830). The con-
spiracist visions of this period are contextualized by relating them to longer-
term evolutions in conceptions of the state and of politics, and to the impact 
of the French Revolution. Comparisons are drawn between the strategies of the 
Right, focusing on the idea of revolutionary conspiracy and generally linked to 
a governmentalist agenda, and of the Left, focusing on a vision of Jesuit or 
theocratic conspiracy and usually oppositional in character. The final section of 
the article analyses the denunciations of the Jesuits in greater detail, through 
the lens of a model of securitization. Emphasis is placed on the ways in which 
denouncers of Jesuit conspiracy combined historical argument with legal at-
tacks on the Jesuits’ corporate existence, on the fluidity of their conceptions of 
the conspiratorial threat, and on the ways in which denunciations of Jesuit 
conspiracy reflect broader liberal anxieties over power and identity in an age of 
political transformation. 
Keywords: conspiracism, conspiracy theories, Jesuits, secrecy, securitization, 
Bourbon Restoration. 
1.  Introduction 
Visions of imagined conspiracy supply scholars with, in Frédéric Monier’s 
words, “a privileged post for observing the fears and apprehensions, and be-
yond that the political and social sensibilities,” of modern societies (Monier 
2003).1 In the century following the French Revolution, such visions were 
                                                             
∗ Geoffrey Cubitt, Department of History, University of York, Heslington, York YO10 5DD, UK; 
geoff.cubitt@york.ac.uk.   
1  There is a large and pluridisciplinary literature on conspiracism and conspiracy theories in 
different places and periods. See Byford (2011) for a recent overview. Much of this litera-
ture (e.g. Campion-Vincent 2005; Taguieff 2005; Fenster 2008; Knight 2002) focuses on 
conspiracy theories in contemporary culture or in twentieth-century history: for longer per-
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pronounced and ubiquitous, and were elaborated across the political spectrum: 
while conservatives and reactionaries denounced the conspiracies of revolu-
tionaries, associated at certain times particularly with Freemasonry, liberals and 
republicans set themselves to expose the hidden reality of counter-
revolutionary and theocratic politics, identified by many with the Jesuit order. 
The present article will briefly address the conspiracist interpretations and 
rhetoric of the Right, but will dwell more deeply on this anti-Jesuit tradition. 
The article focuses especially on the political culture and experiences of the 
Bourbon Restoration period (1814-1830) of French history. This was a period of 
ambiguity and uncertainty – a period of apparent promise for post-Revolutionary 
liberalism undercut by perpetual dangers of counter-revolutionary retrench-
ment. Denunciations of conspiracy by the Jesuits and their perceived allies 
(identified with varying degrees of vagueness using terms like the Congréga-
tion and the parti prêtre) supplied a language for denouncing the politics of 
theocracy and ultraroyalism that had appeal both to outright opponents of the 
Bourbon regime and to those who sought to steer it in a more liberal direction, 
and also indeed to some of its more conservative supporters – men like the 
Comte de Montlosier, whose Mémoire à consulter sur un système religieux et 
politique tendant à renverser la religion, la société et le trône (1826), couched 
in the tones of Gallican monarchism, was to be the most influential tract in this 
anti-theocratic tradition. 
In previous work, I have explored the contribution of the conspiracy theory 
concerning the Jesuits to the politics of Restoration France, and its place in a 
broader history of conspiracist thinking (Cubitt 1993).2 This article has a dif-
ferent purpose – to examine Restoration attacks on the Jesuits in relation to the 
concept of securitization. How do models of securitization assist our analysis of 
the themes and terms of anti-Jesuit denunciations? How, in turn, can reflections 
on the ways in which Jesuit conspiracy was imagined nourish our thinking on 
securitization processes? My discussion of these issues moves from the broad 
and schematic to the particular. Section 2 presents introductory general obser-
vations on the triangular relationships between concepts of security, secrecy 
and conspiracy. Section 3 contextualizes the developments of the Restoration 
period by sketching a schematic outline of long term evolutions in the way 
these concepts were entangled. Section 4 focuses more specifically on the 
ideological conditions of the Restoration itself and outlines certain comparisons 
between the conspiracist thinking of Left and Right during this period. Section 5 
                                                                                                                                
spectives, see the older works of e.g. Hofstadter (1965), Davis (1971), Roberts (1972), Rogalla 
von Bieberstein (1976), and Poliakov (1980-5). My own earlier thinking on conspiracy theo-
ries in general is set out in Cubitt (1989a; 1993, esp. 1-3, 295-309). 
2  Many of the aspects of nineteenth-century French anti-Jesuitism that are referred to here 
are explored further in Cubitt (1993), and also in Leroy (1992). For discussion of the anti-
Jesuit tradition across a longer period, see Brou (1906-7), Leroy (2000), Burke (2001). 
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explores the denunciations of Jesuit and Jesuitical conspiracy in more detail, 
analysing their strategy and thematics in relation to the concept of securitiza-
tion. 
2.  Security, Secrecy and Conspiracy: General Observations 
The starting point for this discussion is the so-called ‘Copenhagen school’ 
framework – the model for thinking about security set out most influentially in 
Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde’s Security; a New Framework for Analysis 
(1998). The Copenhagen school rejects a reified notion of security, such as 
would provide criteria for distinguishing ‘real’ security threats from false ones, 
in favour of a constructivist understanding of ‘securitization’ as a process. 
Securitization, in this understanding, consists in the designation of particular 
fields or realms of activity as ones in which a existential threat is being immi-
nently posed to the survival and integrity of some ‘referent object’, whose 
value and legitimacy require special measures of security – measures, in other 
words, which go beyond and perhaps infringe the normal rules of politics – to 
be taken in its defence. Securitization begins in arguments (‘securitizing 
moves’), advanced by individuals or groups (‘securitizing actors’), who detect 
or wish to affirm an urgent threat to the referent object, but securitization as a 
process is only accomplished when these arguments gain acceptance in deci-
sion-making circles, and sufficient acquiescence from society at large for secu-
rity measures to be set in place – a process which may or may not involve the 
establishment or mobilization of specialist security agencies or institutions 
(Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde 1998, esp. ch. 2). Security arguments are always 
likely to be contested, whether because the existence or gravity of the threat is 
questioned, or because the exceptional measures proposed for dealing with that 
threat are regarded as excessive or as posing a threat to other referent objects. 
Processes of securitization may in some cases therefore require a certain secre-
cy or may be actively resisted in certain quarters. 
Though the term ‘security dispositif’ is not present in the original Copenha-
gen school formulation, it offers a convenient way of describing the usually 
heterogeneous assemblage of material and immaterial elements (discourses, 
arguments, images, regulatory measures, laws, institutional and spatial ar-
rangements) through which securitization is enacted and expressed in particular 
cases. Thus understood, a ‘security dispositif’ is not a rigid structure, but a 
flexible amalgam of different elements that may be combined in different ways 
at different moments. Crucial to the concept of a ‘dispositif’, however, is the 
idea that such combinations have (in Foucault’s words) ‘a dominant strategic 
function’ of ‘responding to an urgent need’ (Foucault 1980, 194-5) – in this 
case that of protecting the referent object against existential threat. The notion 
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of a ‘security dispositif’ thus reinforces the notions of urgency and response 
that are implicit in the concept of securitization itself. 
Building on the Copenhagen school model, we may suggest that four dis-
tinct though often interconnecting motions of identification typically play a part 
in securitization processes and in the ‘security dispositifs’ they give rise to. 
These identify, respectively, the ‘referent object’ (in modern societies usually 
the state or nation, though it may in some cases be e.g. a dynasty, religion or 
the church, or some abstraction like public morality or modern civilisation); the 
human forces threatening that object (often but not always a definable collec-
tivity – a group or race or secret society or political movement); the terrain or 
terrains on which the threat is allegedly posed (typically the traditional terrains 
of political, military and diplomatic activity, but possibly also including ter-
rains like the economy, education, culture or the environment); and the means 
or agencies of redress (the special measures, particular laws, institutions, media 
or police and security agencies that are looked to as the means of combating the 
security threat). The relationships between these identifying motions, and the 
relative weight attached to them at particular moments, are however historical-
ly variable: not every denunciation of a menacing collectivity pays detailed 
attention to the modes of redress; not every affirmation of a referent object’s 
vulnerability on a particular terrain clearly specifies the enemy. In some scenar-
ios, already established security agencies – police forces, intelligence services, 
religious inquisitions – take the initiative in mapping security terrains and 
denouncing new groups of enemies. In other cases, securitization may be driv-
en more by a sudden shift in definitions of the referent object (a shift from 
legitimate monarchy to republican democracy, for example), or by the in-
creased currency of a particular vision of the subversive enemy (a conspiracy 
theory about a particular group, for example). 
Historicizing security means paying attention not just to accomplished pro-
cesses of securitization, but to security arguments, the debates they provoke, 
and the larger cultural imaginaries they draw upon. These arguments, debates 
and imaginaries may be politically, socially and culturally significant even 
when the means of carrying securitization into institutional effect are lacking. 
Nor, as the Copenhagen school themselves make clear (Buzan, Wæver, and De 
Wilde 1998, 27), need we restrict our attention in such a historicizing project to 
cases where the terminology of ‘security’ that has become familiar in the con-
texts of modern state activity and international relations is explicitly in use: the 
concept of securitization may also be a useful analytical device in exploring 
earlier patterns of alarm and response, revolving, for example, around concepts 
of heresy, witchcraft, conspiracy or cabal. In what follows, we will focus par-
ticularly on the long-running triangular entanglement of security arguments 
with notions of secrecy and of conspiracy. 
Security and secrecy have obvious, but sometimes ambiguous, historical 
linkages. Secrecy – in the sense of information or interests concealed or ex-
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empted from scrutiny – may be envisaged as an attribute of the referent object 
(the state, for example): state secrets may be part of what security measures are 
designed to protect. But secrecy may also be part of the means of protection: 
the need to securitize security operations themselves breeds an escalating clan-
destinity – a growth of the ‘secret state’ – which can in turn provoke mistrust 
and suspicion, especially when security agencies are perceived to be (perhaps 
clandestinely) violating the legitimate secrets of others. “A symmetrical rela-
tionship of mistrust and fear” (Dewerpe 1994, 94) between security agencies 
and citizens, grounded in the duality of secrecy as means of power and means 
of evasion, weaves itself through many security scenarios. 
Conspiracism – the tendency to think of politics and society in terms of con-
spiratorial machinations – further enriches the mix. Conspiracy combines con-
notations of secrecy with ones of collusion, planning and deception. Conspira-
cies can be imagined against the security of the state (or some other referent 
object), in defence of that security, and in subversion of that defence from 
within: discourses evoking them can articulate the ways in which security 
actors and security agencies view the world around them, or can form part of 
the way they themselves are viewed. The element of secrecy in conspiracy, 
furthermore, can be taken to operate on different imagined levels: what is felt 
to be secret may, in some cases, be the very existence of an unsuspected group 
of political actors (a secret society or occult government); in others, it may be 
the hidden motives or concealed loyalties of recognised public figures (as in the 
frequent denunciations of politicians as conspirators during the French Revolu-
tion) or the secret machinations of security agencies themselves (Cubitt 1989b). 
There are multiple ways, therefore, in which conspiracist thinking can help to 
prime, or in turn can be primed by, securitization strategies. Unravelling these 
historically also involves taking stock of significant variations in conspiracism 
itself as a discursive phenomenon. One must distinguish, for example, between 
conspiracism of the diffuse kind, which habitually seeks conspiratorial explana-
tions of events without necessarily joining them together in a larger pattern, 
and conspiracism as we find it in the more developed conspiracy theory vi-
sions, which posits the conspiratorial agency of a particular group – the Jews, 
or Jesuits, or Freemasons, or Communists, for example – as a driving force in 
contemporary affairs, and perhaps in history more generally, and which main-
tains this as a standing explanation and a key alarmist theme over a significant 
period (Cubitt 1989a, 13-14; 1993, 1). Conspiracist discourse also oscillates 
between a preoccupation with the exposure of individual guilt (involving the 
denunciation of conspirators and the discovery of links between them) and the 
interpretative mapping of sinister patterns in history and current affairs, in 
which emphasis is placed on the deceptiveness of surface appearances and the 
binary character of a reality shaped by the confrontations of good and evil, but 
in which culprits may be only vaguely identified (Cubitt 1989a, 19-24; 1993, 
296). 
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3.  Contextualizing Restoration Conspiracism 
Moving on from these general reflections on the complex intersections between 
notions of security, of secrecy and of conspiracy, but remaining at a schematic 
level, we may posit a historical evolution, from the security world of the early 
absolutist state to that of modern political societies. In the imaginative econo-
my of the absolutist state, legitimate secrecy is concentrated around the ruler: 
secretiveness is an attribute of sovereignty, a “ruse du pouvoir” (Dewerpe 
1994, 75) and ordinary members of society, individually or collectively, have 
no right to protection from the ruler’s sovereign gaze. Conspiracy as a political 
crime is similarly concentrated: it takes the form either of conspiracy against 
the person of the monarch, or of conspiracy to subvert or to resist the mon-
arch’s intentions and the operations of monarchical power. In the emerging 
state forms of the modern era, this absolutist conception gives way gradually to 
one in which sovereignty is seen as vested in society or in the people, and in 
which state secrecy can therefore only be justified in terms of the public inter-
est (Dewerpe 1994, 77-9). At the same time, however, the increasing complexi-
ty of state structures means that opportunities for the illicit subversion or cir-
cumvention of power, and space to imagine conspiracies within and around 
those structures, are generally increased. Transparency is withheld, suspicions 
of occult government or corruption within the system proliferate.  
Although post-enlightenment thinking gives a central place to notions of 
transparency, it by no means abolishes the tendency to view secrecy as an 
operational necessity of statecraft (Dewerpe 1994, 79-81). Indeed, the modern 
tendency to posit the state as the mechanism through which society legitimately 
regulates and thus ensures and protects the well-being of its members simply 
transforms the terms in which this necessity is affirmed. It is in the interest of 
society, and of whatever values society is presumed to embody, that the state 
claims for its agencies a monopoly over “la méfiance légitime” (Karila-Cohen 
2005, 731, 746; also Dewerpe 1994, 85-7) – a right of scrutiny over society, 
coupled with a right to be themselves exempted from scrutiny where the needs 
of security require it. In affirming this monopoly, however, it also acquires 
powers of penetration into society that bring it into conflict with claims of 
privacy as a crucial aspect of the liberty of individuals.  
If the state is one zone of contention in this transition to a modern politics of 
security and conspiracy, public opinion is another. The promise of post-
enlightenment thinking is that public opinion, articulated through the press and 
perhaps through representative institutions, can ensure the transparency that 
state structures may withhold. Yet this protection is itself uncertain, if opinion 
itself can be subverted or manipulated. Corruption of public opinion, whether 
through calumny or the false inflation of reputations (a common theme in 
French Revolutionary conspiracy polemics), or through the penetration of the 
media or of education – the twin vehicles of public enlightenment – by a vi-
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cious sectional interest, becomes a recurrent theme of conspiracist discourse in 
the modern era.  
The conspiracist denunciations of the French Restoration, both on the Right 
and on the Left, participate in these long-term evolutions. The Restoration, 
however, was a period of ambiguity and uncertainty, at once shaped by and 
framed in tension with the ruptures of the Revolutionary era that preceded it.3 
The Revolution had decisively called in question, without yet comprehensively 
banishing from the stage of history, the monarchical concepts of sovereignty 
that had underpinned the political culture of the old regime. The Revolution 
had also, in its Jacobin phase especially, witnessed the escalating development 
of a security culture grounded in an almost delirious vision of conspiracy 
against the Revolution and against the public interest: Revolutionary patriotism 
was framed in terms of ceaseless vigilance and readiness to denounce the ene-
mies of the people (see e.g. Cubitt 1989; 1999; Tackett 2000; Linton 2004; 
Furet 1981, 53-8; Hunt 1984, 38-45). The Revolutionary Terror that resulted 
was in many respects a cautionary episode for the generations that followed: it 
carried a warning, to liberals as well as to conservatives, of the dangers of a 
politics founded on the institutionalisation of conspiracist mistrust (e.g. Malan-
dain 2011, 168). Even as they sought to defend the achievements of the Revo-
lution in the face first of Napoleonic despotism and then of Restoration ultra-
royalist reaction, post-Revolutionary liberals would feel the need to distance 
themselves from this Jacobin example.  
On the other hand, Restoration political culture continued to be marked by a 
pervasive binarism, grounded in the historical cleavage that the Revolution was 
perceived to have initiated. Both on the Left and on the Right – and the distinc-
tion between political Left and Right is itself, of course, an expression of this 
binarism – the assumption that the modern era was the site of a fundamental 
confrontation between Revolution and Counter-Revolution, between the spirits 
and legacies of the Ancien Régime and of the new world that the Revolution 
had initiated, and that this was so to speak the concealed reality beneath the 
surface vicissitudes of modern politics, was widespread. Everything, the liberal 
polemicist abbé de Pradt affirmed in 1825, was now reducible to a single ques-
tion: “for or against the Revolution, before or after the Revolution” (De Pradt 
1825, 237). Some political actors identified intransigently with one of the ex-
tremes in this polarity, and were apt to find that the methods of the conspirato-
rial secret society – republican or Bonapartist on the one hand (Spitzer 1971; 
                                                             
3  For an exposition of another aspect of this ambiguity, involving the tension between a 
politics of oubli geared to ‘forgetting’ and therefore healing the social and political wounds 
of the Revolutionary period, and a contrary politics geared to remembering and expiating 
Revolutionary criminality and apostasy, see Kroen (1998; 2000, ch. 1). General surveys of 
Restoration politics include Bertier de Sauvigny (1966); Jardin and Tudesq (1983); Wares-
quiel (1996). On the politics of the Restoration Left more specifically, see Alexander (2003). 
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1973; Lambert 1995; Tardy 2006), ultraroyalist or theocratic on the other 
(Bertier de Sauvigny 1948) – were the only ways of pursuing their extremist 
agendas. Others – realists or moderates of either camp – sought to craft a mid-
dle way, placing faith in the constitutional monarchism embodied in the Char-
ter of 1814 to balance the legitimate interests of monarchy and society. The 
pervasive binarism meant, however, that moderate positions were perpetually 
vulnerable to the suspicion of concealing conspiratorial extremist agendas. And 
with suspicion came the possibility of denunciation: wary though Frenchmen 
might be of rekindling the excesses of the Terror, readiness to denounce a 
conspiratorial enemy continued for many to be a key element in civic responsi-
bility. Denunciation, as Gilles Malandain has put it in summarizing this posi-
tion, was “necessary in order to re-establish an indispensable self-transparency 
of the social body and to emerge from the Revolutionary anxiety [inquiétude]” 
(Malandain 2011, 168). 
Coupled to this habit of suspicion was an entrenched ambivalence about 
state power, again across most of the political spectrum. The Restoration inher-
ited a potent police apparatus, shaped by the successive authoritarian concerns 
of the Ancien Régime, the Revolution and the Napoleonic Empire, and geared 
to assorted forms of surveillance and clandestine action (Malandain 2003, 67-
73, Riberette 1979; Berlière 2003). It inherited also habits of administrative 
thought that viewed the state as the exerciser of a necessary and persistent 
surveillance over society, increasingly justifying this surveillance in terms of 
the state’s function of developing and deploying expert knowledge of society 
“and of the tensions traversing it” (Karila-Cohen 2005, 747). These ideological 
and organisational elements were in obvious tension with those other currents 
in post-Enlightenment thinking that stressed the primacy of individual liberty, 
the need for transparency in government, and the sanctity of the private sphere. 
These tensions found no stable resolution in the Restoration period, or for a 
good time afterwards. Out of power, politicians of different ideological hues 
denounced the manipulative and inquisitorial practices of the police and sound-
ed the alarm over threats to the liberties of families and individuals. As part of 
this, they were often scathing in analysing the destructive anti-conspiratorial 
obsessions of public officials, Guizot’s Des Conspirations et de la justice poli-
tique (1821) being the most notable work in this vein. As potential users of 
power, however, few politicians were willing to forgo or to dismantle the facili-
ties of control and surveillance that the post-Revolutionary state afforded. As 
Pierre Karila-Cohen has shown, parliamentary debate over the fonds secrets – 
the funding of the political police – was always lively, but was underscored by 
a fairly general acceptance that secret policing methods of some sort or other 
were a natural and necessary facet of state power (Karila-Cohen 2005). 
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4.  Conspiracy, Government and Opposition: Right and 
 Left 
Conceptions of a conspiratorial threat to the French state or French society 
tended during this period to prioritise internal over external dangers. This is to 
some extent an artificial distinction. Both on the left and on the right, the binary 
struggle was conceived to be universal rather than merely French in its scope 
and implications. Frenchmen avidly scrutinized the press for reports of Revolu-
tionary or Counter-Revolutionary advances in other countries, and in the case 
of the Jesuits, the idea that the hidden enemy had its organizational centre in 
Rome – that it was, in the liberal lawyer Dupin aîné’s much repeated words a 
“sword whose hilt is at Rome and whose point is everywhere” (Procès 1826, 
129) – was a common polemical theme. Even in this case, however, those 
imagining a Jesuit occult power were at least as likely to locate its centre at 
‘Montrouge’ – the site of the Jesuit noviciate to the South of Paris, taken by 
many to be the order’s French headquarters. The emphasis was not on con-
spiratorial aggressions by one state power against another: the primary enemy 
was not the foreigner, but the ideological enemy within France itself. 
Both on the Right and on the Left, then, denunciations of a conspiratorial 
enemy were a recurrent feature of French Restoration political mentalities. 
Right-wing denunciations of Revolutionary conspiracy and left-wing denuncia-
tions of the Jesuits and their associates had certain similarities, and performed 
some of the same legitimising and explanatory functions. A closer inspection, 
however, also reveals differences. The most obvious is that the Right’s denun-
ciation of conspiracy remained, throughout the Restoration, largely focused on 
an oppositional threat, a threat from outside the state structure. The Left’s de-
nunciations of conspiracy, by contrast, dealt more flexibly with a conspiracy 
that was sometimes imagined to be threatening the structures of power from 
without, and sometimes to be entrenched within them as a form of occult gov-
ernment. Prior to 1820 (and more briefly in 1828-9), liberals were able to see 
Restoration monarchy as offering, at least potentially, a viable constitutional 
structure for the development of a liberal polity: the Jesuits were denounced as 
a danger, but not yet as an integral part of the system. Between 1820 and 1827 
and after 1829, as the ultraroyalist grip on Restoration government was felt to 
tighten, denunciations of Jesuit conspiracy focused more and more on the idea 
of a governmental power colonized and subverted from within. The ultraroyal-
ist ministries of the period were denigrated first as governments allied to the 
Jesuits and then as governments in thrall to the Jesuits, or simply Jesuit gov-
ernments. “The word Jesuit today characterizes the whole system of the gov-
ernment”, wrote the liberal journalist Thiers in early 1827 (in Marquant 1959, 
392). Though the theme of Jesuit occult government could still be deployed by 
liberals in ways which avoided openly challenging the Bourbon monarchy 
HSR 38 (2013) 1  │  116 
itself, images depicting Charles X himself as a Jesuit also began to circulate 
(Cubitt 1993, 100). Encompassed within this vision of a Jesuit power at work 
within the structures of government and administration was the idea that the 
apparatus of state security had itself been subverted, indeed, had become an 
active part of the means of subversion: the police had become, in liberal par-
lance, ‘the police of the Congrégation’ or ‘of Montrouge’. 
Practical differences in the counter-conspiratorial strategies of Left and 
Right followed from this difference in the relationship to state power. The 
conspiracist vision of the Right evolved in a relatively close relationship to the 
security apparatus and to legal definitions of internal security.4 Gilles Malan-
dain’s research on the evolution and uses of the law relating to conspiracies 
against the security of the state in France across the first half of the nineteenth 
century allow certain key points to be emphasised (Malandain 2003, 55-67). 
The Restoration preserved the 1810 Napoleonic Penal Code’s relatively narrow 
definition of ‘crimes against the internal security of the state’ as crimes against 
the life or person of the monarch and his family, including attempts or conspir-
acies to destroy or change the royal form of government or to disrupt the line of 
succession or to incite rebellion against royal authority, together with attempts 
or conspiracies to stir up civil war or other forms of internecine devastation, but 
excluding for example such crimes as obstructing the functioning of parliamen-
tary assemblies which had found a place in the Revolutionary Code of 1791. 
The Restoration, however, broke new ground in its provisions for handling 
offences against security, by referring such offences to the special jurisdiction 
of the Chambre des Pairs, the higher parliamentary chamber functioning here 
as a legal tribunal, crucially without a jury.  
The Restoration also carried over from the Napoleonic Code that Code’s 
specific handling of the relationship between ‘complot’, ‘attentat’ and complet-
ed action, in relation to crimes against the monarch and his authority. By apply-
ing the same penalty – death and confiscation of property – to these three dif-
ferent moments in the working out of a conspiratorial design, the Code offered 
the advantage, for the authorities, of being able to nip conspiratorial projects in 
the bud, as soon as an agreement of individuals to act together in a treasonable 
purpose could be demonstrated, without the need to wait for concrete action, 
still less for the design to be put into effect (Malandain 2003, 62-7; 2011, 122-
5). The disadvantage, for the citizen, lay in the opening up of a massive excep-
tion to the otherwise generally held principle that only actions and not senti-
ments or intentions or suspected dispositions should be regarded as criminal. 
Critics like Guizot were quick to denounce the encouragement thus given to the 
authorities to deploy informers and agents provocateurs, and speculatively to 
                                                             
4  For continuations of the governmentalist and conservative preoccupation with conspiracy 
in the decades after the period considered here, see Tardy (2012); Poncier (1999); for a more 
general overview of the secret societies mythology, Roberts (1972). 
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construct allegedly conspiratorial patterns out of patchworks of vaguely suspi-
cious ‘faits généraux’ (Guizot, 1821; see also Tardy 2008). Where conspiracy 
in the strictest sense of a provable conjuration of actors to achieve a particular 
end proved hard to establish, as in the case of Louvel’s assassination of the Duc 
de Berry in 1820, ultraroyalist commentators fell back on the notion of a ‘con-
spiracy of ideas’, in which the perceived congruence of liberal doctrines with 
the regicidal outcome represented by Louvel’s attack was considered sufficient 
to establish the deed itself as in effect the outcome of a liberal conspiracy 
(Malandain 2011, 35; see also Skuy 2003). 
On the Left (and among more conservative critics of the Jesuits) as on the 
Right, the idea of a conspiratorial threat to the personal security of the monarch 
was frequently evoked. Regicide – as allegedly practised by the Jesuits against 
monarchs like Henri III and Henri IV and attempted against others – had long 
been a standard reference of anti-Jesuit polemic, and it retained its place in the 
repertoire under the Restoration. “It is against the principal members of the 
Bourbon family that the Jesuits turned the daggers of their fanatical pupils”, 
one author reminded royalist readers in 1824 (Flocon and Beckhaus 1824, xi), 
while two others in 1825 pointedly opened and closed a new history of Jesuit 
conspiracies against the Bourbons with the assertion that “The dagger which 
struck down the best of our kings [Henri IV] threatens his children” (Monglave 
and Chalas 1825, 1, 423). But while the regicidal theme remained popular, its 
uses on the Left were now mainly tactical: it is questionable whether many of 
those who denounced the Jesuits’ influence in the 1820s really feared a Jesuit-
directed assault on the life of the monarch. When Louvel assassinated the Duc 
de Berry in 1820, the liberal press evoked the history of Jesuit regicide as a 
way of deflecting the ultraroyalist claim that regicidal outrages were necessari-
ly liberal or revolutionary in origin, but their principal argument was that Lou-
vel was an isolated fanatic, not that he was part of a Jesuit conspiracy (Cubitt 
1993, 199-200). Liberals at this moment no doubt lacked the influence in police 
and judicial circles to launch a serious hunt for Jesuit regicidal conspirators, but 
a broader reading of anti-Jesuit denunciations suggests that their apprehensions 
were in any case focused in other areas. The elements composing the loose-knit 
‘dispositif’ that took shape around the sometimes nebulous idea of a Jesuit-
directed conspiracy may be anatomized under the four headings that emerged 
from our earlier schematic modelling of securitization: referent object, threat-
ening forces, fields of insecurity, means of redress. 
5.  Restoration Anti-Jesuitism: Conspiracism, Legality and 
 Securitization 
The affective force of conspiracy theories, as of arguments for securitization, 
lies in the assumption that the conspiracy is aimed against a referent object (or 
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a plurality of such objects) whose legitimacy is generally recognised and whose 
existence and integrity are therefore highly valued. Establishing the definition 
of such referent objects is likely to be harder – but therefore possibly also more 
urgent – under conditions of contestation or division, where the very basis of 
political legitimacy is or has recently been in question. The uses of the anti-
Jesuit conspiracy vision in Restoration France were closely linked to the com-
plexities of an oppositional politics that sought to present itself as a defence of 
core political values, while challenging the way those values were interpreted 
by ultra-royalist opinion. It was linked also, at a more pragmatic level, to the 
need to bring together different factions of opposition – royalist and Gallican as 
well as liberal or closet Bonapartist or Republican – whose potential for collab-
oration lay more in common hostility to theocracy than in any broader political 
agreement. A certain equivocation, or at least a degree of flexibility or mutabil-
ity in the definition of the referent object were common features of the con-
spiracist vision. Montlosier’s famous denunciation described ‘un système reli-
gieux et politique tendant à renverser la religion, la société et le trône’ – a 
triadic formulation of the referent object with an obvious appeal to conserva-
tive royalists of a Gallican persuasion like the author himself (Montlosier 
1826a). The Liberal newspaper Le Constitutionnel, on the other hand, declared 
in the same year that France saw in the reapparition of the Jesuits  
the counter-revolution in its entirety, a war to the death against her institu-
tions, against her laws, her moeurs, her enlightenment and her prosperity; the 
ruination of the liberty which she has only obtained through so many efforts 
and sacrifices, and the return of the bloody regime of theocracy (Le Constitu-
tionnel 23 September 1826).  
The emphasis here was on the defence of an institutional, legal and cultural 
status quo, viewed as existentially fundamental to the nation, but defined less 
through an association with monarchy and religion than as the moderate liberal 
legacy of the Revolutionary achievement. Though differently inflected, con-
servative and liberal formulations of the referent object were not necessarily 
incompatible: anti-Jesuit polemics frequently combined elements of the two. 
If the definition of the referent object was flexible and variable, the identifi-
cation of the threatening forces also presented certain ambiguities, though the 
Jesuits were at the core of most accounts. The most obvious ambiguities 
stemmed from the assumed and imagined but often vaguely specified relation-
ship between the Jesuits in the strict sense (those who were or were held to be 
actual members of the Society of Jesus) and the ranks of the so-called Congré-
gation – the latter term referring to what was alleged to be a secret society of 
Jesuitical laymen masquerading as a pious confraternity (Bertier de Sauvigny 
1948, 369-74, 402-7; Cubitt 1993, 80-2, 216-8).5 Denouncers of the Jesuits saw 
                                                             
5  The conspiracist vision of the Congrégation conflated perceptions of a genuine pious associ-
ation directed by the Jesuit Père Ronsin with ones probably reflecting the activity of an ul-
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the Congrégation (or sometimes the congrégations in the plural, to indicate 
multiple organisations) as a powerful network of Jesuit affiliations – an orga-
nized horde of ‘short-robed Jesuits’ extending the reach of Jesuit power in the 
political arena and throughout society (Cubitt 1993, 80-2). According to the 
Journal des débats, the Congrégation “is to Jesuitism what the pioneers are to 
the army: it prepares the way” (Journal des débats 13 March 1826). But though 
this network was frequently denounced, its structures typically remained 
opaque; indeed this opacity was sometimes cited as proof of its Jesuit charac-
ter. In Montlosier’s account, the Congrégation was “as confused in its composi-
tion as in its object, and in its object as in its origin”:  
It is as impossible for me to say with precision what it is, as to show how, in 
the past, it has successively formed, extended, organized itself. I say orga-
nized, with the reservation that sometimes its body is whole; and then one sees 
a trunk and limbs; at other times some of these limbs withdraw from it, it 
appears mutilated. The body itself is composed in such a way as to be able, 
when convenient, to dispel itself like a shadow; and then one wonders whether 
it is true that a congrégation exists (Montlosier 1826a, 17-9).  
The myth of the Congrégation significantly extended the range of anti-Jesuit 
suspicions. A dual logic characteristic of conspiracist reasoning came into 
operation: wherever reactionary or theocratic encroachments were detected, 
even if the immediately observable agents were not apparently members of the 
Jesuit order, the Jesuits’ hidden hand was suspected; wherever actual Jesuits 
were found, even if their activities appeared outwardly inoffensive, a broader 
and darker conspiratorial design was deemed to be in operation. This dual 
patterning of the political imagination contributed strikingly to the denuncia-
tions of theocracy and occult government that became a ubiquitous feature of 
oppositional politics. 
The fields of insecurity – the terrains on which an existential threat to the 
referent object or objects (in their fluctuating definitions) was considered to be 
being posed – were thus diverse. Traditional references to regicide, though 
persistent, now shared the field with other denunciations: the controlling influ-
ence of the Jesuits was detected in the realm of ultraroyalist politics, in the hell-
fire preaching of missionaries in the French countryside, in the proliferation of 
pious and charitable associations, in the education of the social elite. Even 
domesticity was a terrain of vulnerability: Stendhal claimed in 1826 that 
scarcely a respectable householder in France would have failed to notice the 
efforts made to turn his servants into Jesuit spies (New Monthly Magazine, 
October 2006). Critiques of Jesuit casuistry dating back to the seventeenth 
century were recycled to show the damaging effect that Jesuit education or 
Jesuit confessors would have on public and private morality (Cubitt 1993, 258-
                                                                                                                                
traroyalist secret society, the Chevaliers de la Foi (Bertier de Sauvigny 1848, 369-74; see 
also Casanova 1970, 104-124).  
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74). Wherever the tentacles of Jesuit affiliation or the sinister influence of 
Jesuit teachers or confessors could be imagined as reaching, referent objects 
were imagined to be under threat. 
Finding means of combatting such a proliferating, multi-faceted, outwardly 
amorphous and shifting conspiratorial menace, other than simply by publicity, 
was inevitably problematic. The Jesuits’ opponents turned not to the Penal 
Code’s definitions of treasonable conspiracy, but to the law on associations, 
coupled to a vociferous strategy of historical exposure. Legal and historical 
arguments were closely entwined. Where the law on conspiracies focused 
attention on actions and intentions, real or alleged, invocations of the law on 
associations could only target the Jesuits’ existence as a collective or corporate 
entity – on the face of it, a rather oblique way of grappling with a conspiratorial 
enemy. Hence the energy devoted by anti-Jesuit commentators to cataloguing 
the past misdeeds attributed to the Jesuit order – listing regicidal attacks, listing 
acts of intolerance, assembling references to the sinister influence of Jesuit 
confessors – and assembling also the numerous condemnations and criticisms 
of the Jesuit order issued by secular and ecclesiastical authorities over the three 
centuries of the order’s previous existence (Cubitt 1993, 188-93). Recitation of 
the order’s damnable curriculum vitae created a mood in which the mere fact 
of its presence on French soil could be presented as pregnant with menace, 
while the act of placing themselves in line with successive waves of earlier 
critics of the order allowed Restoration denouncers of Jesuit influence to de-
flect the charge of partisanship. By placing their moderate defence of the Revo-
lutionary achievement under the patronage of traditions of public vigilance 
deeply rooted in the soil of the Ancien Régime, post-revolutionary liberals 
could reach out, across the binary divide, to Gallican monarchist opponents of 
theocracy like Montlosier. Nor was this an entirely cynical manoeuvre. Even as 
they approved the work of the Revolution in demolishing the structures of the 
Ancien Régime, many liberals looked back with a degree of anxious nostalgia 
to the days when powerful corporate bodies like the Parlements and the Sor-
bonne had been sturdy obstacles to Jesuit encroachments. In a post-
Revolutionary society stripped of these defences, the rebuilding of security – 
whether by persuading contemporary institutions like the Cours Royales to 
assume the mantle of the Parlements, or by trusting in the press and parliamen-
tary representatives to exercise a similar magistrature of vigilance informally – 
was a pressing priority (Cubitt 1993, 55-7). 
Establishing continuity between Ancien Régime and post-Revolutionary 
traditions of vigilance was not, however, a straightforward matter. The Jesuit 
order itself had been banned from France in the 1760s and disbanded by the 
Papacy in 1774; when it was restored in 1814, its presence in France, as else-
where in Europe, had to be rebuilt almost from scratch (Cubitt 1993, 19-20; for 
more detail, Burnichon 1914-21). It was restored, furthermore, into a world 
whose political and social co-ordinates had been disrupted and radically altered 
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by the experience of the Revolution. Under these circumstances, the revival of 
anti-Jesuit vigilance depended on arguing, firstly, that the restored Jesuit order 
was the same as the old one, and secondly, that the essential principles that had 
inspired previous condemnations of the order were still applicable. The first of 
these needs was met by pointing to the continuity of the Jesuit order’s constitu-
tions, deemed by anti-Jesuit commentators to be fundamental to the immutable 
spirit that had inspired the earlier record of Jesuit infamy: ‘it is evidently the 
same spirit’, declared Montlosier, ‘since it is the same institution’ (Montlosier 
1826a, 129-30). In addressing the second need, anti-Jesuit commentators en-
countered a more complex set of issues, relating to the law on associations, and 
more specifically to the legal status of religious orders.6 
In a ruling that continued to be much cited in the nineteenth century, the 
Parlement de Paris in 1762 had declared the Society of Jesus to be 
[…] inadmissible by its nature in every organized state [État policé], as con-
trary to natural  right, damaging to [attentatoire à] all spiritual and temporal 
authority, and tending to  introduce into the Church and into States, under the 
specious veil of a religious institute, […] a political body, whose essence con-
sists in a continuous activity aiming by all sorts of routes, direct or indirect, 
concealed or public, first at an absolute independence, and successively at  the 
usurpation of all authority […] (Arrêt du Parlement de Paris). 
Whether or not this pre-Revolutionary ruling retained any legal force in the 
new world of post-Revolutionary liberty – a matter that was debated – for 
Restoration opponents of the Jesuits its message of the intimate connection 
between evasion of surveillance, aspiration to independence and intended usur-
pation remained crucial. Restoration liberals, for all their advocacy of individu-
al freedoms, seldom envisaged these freedoms as including an uncontrolled 
freedom of association. The influential liberal lawyer Dupin aîné asked rhetori-
cally: “Where indeed is the people, where is the government that has ever ac-
corded to its citizens the unlimited faculty of organizing themselves in secret as 
the fancy takes them, and of creating within the bosom of the great society 
secondary societies capable of counterbalancing by their influence the opera-
tion of the public powers” (Dupin 1860, 263). From this standpoint, organiza-
tions that avoided state surveillance – be they religious orders or secret socie-
ties or workers’ associations – were intrinsically and doubly suspect: first 
because their secretive existence was in itself a denial of legitimate state au-
thority, and second, because such resistance to scrutiny could only be explained 
by a presumed need to conceal an illicit agenda.  
In the case of the Jesuits, arguments along these lines were given a specific 
inflection by debates over the legal status of unauthorized religious orders in 
                                                             
6  For a more detailed exposition of the legal issues summarized in the next two paragraphs, 
see Cubitt 1993, 44-54. The main legal arguments against the Jesuits are put in Dupin 1860, 
263-98, 519-34. 
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post-Revolutionary France. This status was ambiguous. The Revolution had 
abolished all religious congregations on French soil; the Napoleonic regime 
had replaced this with a regime of selective authorisation, which the Restora-
tion had extended. The majority especially of male religious orders, including 
the Jesuits, remained formally unauthorised. Opponents of the Jesuits claimed 
that unauthorised meant illegal, and that the very fact of being a member of 
such an order was therefore a defiance of legality. Defenders of the Jesuits 
claimed that lack of authorization simply meant that the order (or the individual 
Jesuit establishment) as a collectivity was not a legally constituted corporate 
entity, empowered to own property and enter into contracts, but that the rights 
of its members as individuals – the religious liberty conferred by the Charter of 
1814, the limited freedom of association allowed by the Penal Code – were 
quite sufficient to allow them to live together and work together, and to organ-
ize their lives together in accordance with the discipline of a religious order, 
even if this order itself had no formal status in the eyes of the law. 
For most of the nineteenth century – until 1880, at least – the status of unau-
thorized religious orders remained contested, with neither the defenders nor the 
opponents of the Jesuits winning more than partial legal victories. This was so 
under the Restoration. Those seeking legal means of fighting back against what 
they saw as a reactionary theocratic conspiracy recognised the dubious legal 
status of the Jesuits as the point on which attack might be concentrated, but 
their efforts to exploit this weak point were only partially successful. The histo-
ry of Montlosier’s campaign – the main focus for these efforts – was one of a 
gradual narrowing of focus and partial frustration (Cubitt 1993, 78-9). In the 
Mémoire à consulter, Montlosier described a multifaceted conspiratorial ‘sys-
tème’. Four constituent ‘scourges’ or ‘great calamities’ were identified – the 
Congrégation, the Jesuits, Ultramontanism and “l’esprit d’envahissement des 
prêtres” (Montlosier 1826a) – and Montlosier’s initial hope may have been that 
the perpetrators of clerical aggression might somehow be caught up in a gen-
eral procès de tendance encompassing all of these circumstantial elements, in a 
method somewhat resembling that used by the Right to detect Revolutionary 
conspiracy. Legal opinion, when consulted about the technicalities, tended to 
dismiss this possibility (of which liberal lawyers anxious not to sharpen weap-
ons that the Right might put to use were always likely to be suspicious), and 
also made clear that if Montlosier’s four scourges were taken separately, only 
the first two (the Congrégation and the Jesuits) had the concreteness to be taken 
seriously as the objects of a judicial denunciation. Some indeed, considered it 
better to focus on the Jesuits alone, without whom, it was suggested “nothing 
of what M. de Montlosier complains of would take place” (Devaux et al. 1826, 
2). When the Cour Royale de Paris considered the legal denunciation Mont-
losier had submitted to it (Montlosier 1826b), it dismissed three out of the four 
scourges as not constituting legal offences: only the case against the Jesuits was 
recognised, and even here the court declined to act, on the grounds that enforc-
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ing the law against the Jesuits was a matter for the police. The Chambre des 
Pairs, to whom Montlosier submitted his complaints in the form of a petition 
(Montlosier 1827), again declined to broaden the focus, forwarding to the gov-
ernment only those parts of the petition that concerned the Jesuits’ unauthor-
ised existence. What had begun, in Montlosier’s mind and in oppositional 
public opinion generally, as a broad and rather sprawling denunciation of con-
spiratorial theocratic aggressions became increasingly a movement focused on 
removing the Jesuits. Even on this ground, the movement’s success was equiv-
ocal. Although Villèle’s ultraroyalist government owed its downfall at the end 
of 1827 at least partially to public resentment of its failure to act against a 
religious order that the Cour Royale had now – in the spirit of the Parlement – 
declared to be not just technically illegal but founded on principles incompati-
ble with the independence of civil government and with the Restoration’s own 
constitutional Charter of 1814, the more liberal Martignac government that 
followed still hesitated to act, and limited itself when it finally did so in June 
1828 to issuing ordinances preventing Jesuits and other members of unauthor-
ised religious orders from operating in the educational arena. This was in prac-
tice an important blow to the restored Jesuit order, but it left much of what 
Montlosier and others had denounced under the heading of Jesuitical conspira-
cy largely untouched. After a brief lull, anti-Jesuit language continued to be 
deployed in the political arena, particularly after Charles X’s instigation of the 
ultraroyalist Polignac ministry in 1828, and the Revolution of July 1830 which 
finally toppled the Restoration monarchy would be represented in liberal quar-
ters as aimed as much against the Jesuits as against the dynasty (Cubitt 1993, 
101-4). 
But if the effort to combat the Jesuits as an association was inconclusive, the 
arguments used in these legal debates are significant also for the ways in which 
they bring certain distinctive liberal insecurities into focus. From the liberal 
point of view, two particular nightmares flickered around these debates. The 
first had to do with the use of the language of individual liberty to protect the 
Jesuits’ shadowy existence as a collectivity. Liberals deplored the hypocrisy, as 
they saw it, of using liberal arguments to defend the notorious enemies of mod-
ern liberty. They also, going further, maintained that the Jesuits’ vow of abso-
lute obedience debarred them from being entitled to the benefits of individuali-
ty. Jesuits were not their own masters: their individuality was an illusion, 
masking a complete devotion to the Jesuit cause. Liberal and anti-Jesuit polem-
ic extended this argument further, to cover those who were regarded as Jesuit 
affiliates: through the Congrégation and other networks, the Jesuit order was 
seen as reaching out to penetrate and enrol French society. This was the sinister 
vision sketched by the liberal deputy Duvergier de Hauranne in 1826: 
The councils of the prince, the law courts, the clergy, the corps constitués, and 
the ranks of all the citizens may be filled with affiliates unknown both to the 
prince and to the public, all acting in accord with secret orders, and exerting 
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themselves to secure the acceptance of maxims contrary to the interests of the 
monarch and of the State (Duvergier de Hauranne 1826-8, vol. I, 199).  
Here was the first nightmare insecurity of Liberalism: the breakdown of the 
liberal society of independent individuals through the misappropriation of 
Liberal freedoms. 
The second nightmare had to do with surveillance and information. By craft-
ing an elusive commonality for themselves in the shadow realm of the unau-
thorised, the Jesuits escaped the official scrutiny that would have been required 
for authorisation. According to their denouncers, this evasion of surveillance 
not only preserved the secrecy that surrounded Jesuit objectives; it also protect-
ed the operations of the order’s own intelligence network – of the systematic 
espionage they were able to conduct by means of the confessional and of their 
secret affiliates in different walks of life (doctors, lawyers, servants and so on). 
According to Giovanni Libri’s slightly later (1843) claims, the Jesuit headquar-
ters at Rome contained enormous registers of the information on individuals 
gathered by these illicit means – “the most gigantic biographical compilation 
that has ever been assembled since the world began”. “When [the Jesuits] 
need[ed] to act on an individual”, Libri maintained, “they open the book, and 
they know immediately his life, his qualities, his defects, his projects, his fami-
ly, his friends, his most secret liaisons” (Libri 1843, 978-9). The Jesuits’ ex-
emption from surveillance exposed society to Jesuit espionage; the privacy 
claimed for the unauthorized left the legitimate secrecy of individuals and 
families exposed to violation. Indeed, inasmuch as the Jesuits were able, 
through their affiliates, to manipulate the state security system, the very system 
of surveillance that they themselves evaded became the instrument of their own 
hold over society. In a world where information had become a crucial lever of 
power, the conspiratorial image of the Jesuits as usurpers of the surveillant 
function revealed the insecurities that haunted the liberal faith in transparency.  
6.  Conclusion 
Applying the lens of a concept of securitization to conspiracist mentalities is an 
illuminating but also a narrowing interpretative project. Conspiracist reasoning 
has been part of the matrix of ideas and assumptions out of which, at certain 
historical moments, securitizing arguments and strategies have emerged, but it 
does not follow from this that models of securitization on their own give a full 
account of how conspiracy theories function socially and politically. Conspira-
cy theories do indeed denounce an existential threat to the welfare, integrity 
and even survival of a referent object or objects, but their possible functions 
run beyond the safeguarding of that object or objects through exceptional 
measures. Denunciations of sinister Jesuit influence could serve, under the 
Restoration, a variety of political purposes, helping oppositional spokesmen to 
HSR 38 (2013) 1  │  125 
forge alliances, to deflect dangers, to discredit political opponents, and perhaps 
in some cases to conceal radical intentions behind a veil of moderate securitiz-
ing concern. These political functions were not precisely aligned with, and may 
sometimes even have been at odds with, the needs of a securitizing strategy 
geared not just to denouncing but also to nullifying a particular conspiratorial 
threat. Liberal and oppositional strategy proceeded on two levels, oscillating 
between the legal pursuit of the Jesuit order and the use of anti-Jesuit rhetoric 
for broader political purposes. It was partly because anti-Jesuit rhetoric served 
these two purposes simultaneously that its own contours and points of focus 
were often fluid and shifting, accommodating oscillation between different 
definitions of the referent objects threatened by Jesuit machinations, between 
broader and narrower accounts of the menacing forces and of the fields of their 
most menacing activity, and between historical and contemporary emphases.  
Thinking about anti-Jesuitism with a model of securitization in mind does, 
however, enable us to see more clearly how shifts in visions of conspiracy 
could affect the terms of securitizing constructions. It allows us to see not just 
how conspiracist understandings could nourish the mood of alarm from which 
securitizing moves emerged, but also how ongoing reconfigurations of the 
Jesuitical menace contributed in the nineteenth century to a diversification of 
the territories on which security concerns would be elaborated. Mental con-
structions of menace and of vulnerability were broadened out from a focus on 
assassination and political espionage to socially-focused anxieties about educa-
tion, association, the family and morality. And by exploring the mental world 
of conspiracism, we can also deepen our understanding of the insecurities that 
have informed the politics of securitization: at stake in the campaigns against 
Jesuit conspiracy were not only the openly stated perceived threats to state and 
society and modernity, but deeper insecurities at the heart of liberal values. 
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